



EFFECTS OF STATE-CENTRIC COUNTER-RADICALIZATION MEASURES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

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Abstract

The shift from diplomacy-based security to security-based diplomacy has been attributed to the fact that generating a comprehensive response to transnational terrorism since September 11, 2001 has proven difficult. There has been an increasing resort to multilateralism and bilateralism in security relations with regard to transnational terrorism. However, the increasing transnational terrorist attacks; particularly terrorist incidences in Kenya with attributes from Somalia have been increasing over time. While the role of military as (a security-based diplomacy approach) has emerged in supporting foreign policy to promote security and deter transnational terrorism, terrorist radicalization has continued to spread building both on the economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states. Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late is thus a priority. The objective of this study was to examine the effect of state-centric counter-radicalization measures in Kenya and Somalia. The study covered Kenya (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa and Mandera) and Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni). The choice of these regions was centred on the Kenya-Somalia relations which have been fraught, often mediated through brute force and mutual suspicion, and mainly viewed as a matter of security; the porous borders refugee crisis as well as concerns of radicalization following the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia. The total sample size for the study was 400. Sampling techniques used included cluster sampling and purposive sampling to determine the settings and the participants. Data collection was both interactive (interviews and focus group discussions) and non-interactive involving questionnaire and document analysis. A total of 350 questionnaires were issued to respondents drawn from state and non-state actors, 20 interview guides targeting key informants drawn from state and non-state actors and 30 respondents from religious institutions participated in Focus Group Discussions. A pilot study was carried out at Jommo Kenyatta International Airport and Kenya Ports Authority in Mombasa. Moreover, a pilot interview and focus group discussion was done with a group of leaders and members drawn from Holy Family Basilica and Jamia Mosque in Nairobi. The reliability of the instruments was determined through the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first and second administration. The study's instruments were tested for validity through consultations and discussions with the supervisors and experts in peace and security sectors for validation. Data were analyzed by use of descriptive statistics, through quantitative and qualitative techniques. The study found out that state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia are weak and disjointed. Moreover, civil society groups are not fully engaged in such initiatives. The study recommended the need for Kenya and Somalia governments to pay more attention on building the capacities of civil society to support implementation of counter-radicalization measures.

Key Words: Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Bilateral Security Relations, Counter Radicalization Programs, Counterradicalization, Deradicalization, Diplomacy, Diplomacy-Based Security, Extremism, Multilateralism, National Security, Security-Based Diplomacy, Terrorism Management, Terrorism, Terrorist Radicalization, Threat to National Security.

Introduction

During the 1990s, the end of the cold war led to an entirely new global security environment, marked by a focus on internal rather than inter-state wars. In the early 21st century, new global threats emerged. The attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States clearly demonstrated the challenge of international terrorism, changing global perspectives on both the threat of terrorism and the tools required to prevent it. Although multilateral instruments against terrorism have existed since the 1960s, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates constitute a new danger that challenges standing tools and institutions (Shaw, 2013).

In the context of security, states have recognized diplomatic relations; they exchange diplomatic agents to facilitate dialogues and cooperation to dealing with insecurity and transnational terrorism. Thus through bilateralism, states can result in more tailored agreements and obligations that only apply to particular contracting states (Koremenos, 2007). The 'Global War on Terror,' led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international alliances in tackling terrorist threats. For example, at a global level, the United States and Russia determined that "best practice" counterterrorism strategies also required increased multilateral partnerships. At the G-8 summit meeting in July 2006, both countries launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Other international collaborative efforts supported by Russia and the United States include the diverse counterterrorism projects of the NATO-Russian Council (Perkovich, 2010).



Management of transnational terrorism refers to strategies and responses to a global response to the terrorism threat between and among countries (Bush, 2009). A number of significant steps have been taken that reflect this concern. This includes the General Assembly's adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 (Foot, 2009). This milestone in the international initiatives to counter terrorism provides for a comprehensive response to terrorism at the national, regional and global level. However, the primary responsibility for its implementation rests with the Member States. Since the effective implementation of the Global Strategy and other international mandates requires the sustained involvement of a wide array of different national actors engaged in numerous different areas, challenges are bound to occur. Chow (2005) argues that cooperation in counterterrorism has altered the perceptions and behavior of states. At the same time, the post-9/11 security environment constrained the sovereignty of other nations (Chow, 2005). This explains why terrorism has and still remains a serious concern globally and that is why the study examined security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia.

Terrorism is a global, regional and local phenomenon and comes in two varieties: domestic and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is homegrown and home directed, with consequences for just the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies (Enders, & Gaibulloev, 2011). Franck, (2012) point out that the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States clearly demonstrated the challenge of international terrorism, changing global perspectives on both the threat of terrorism and the tools required to prevent it. The UN (UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy) and the international community have achieved over the past years great momentum in enhancing co-ordination between global and regional organizations in counterterrorism (Chow, 2005). Although multilateral and bilateral instruments against terrorism have existed since the 1960s, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates constitute a new danger that challenges standing tools and institutions. In Kenya and Somalia, recent terrorist threats and experiences still remain a big challenge for law enforcement agencies and thus the need for a study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia.

In Africa, emerging security threats to nation-states of Africa have become a source of problem for most governments in the continent. Further complicating the security landscape is the increase in the outbreak of transnational terrorism that feeds into the so-called terrorist loop in Africa (Herbst, 2014). The growing audacity of the Nigerian Boko Haram is one among many developments that have made West Africa a region of growing terror concern (Greenberg, 1990). Oden (2001) argues that the Horn of Africa represents a reverse of the theory of hegemonic stability, in which superpower hegemony deepens rather than lessens political stability. Military operations have been employed in Mali and Nigeria to counter transnational terrorism. In spite of these interventions, transnational terrorism pervades Africa (Onuocha & Ezirim, 2013). While diplomacy has been used in Africa to combat terrorism, Tavares (2009) argues that the challenges of lack of an efficient regional and organizational structure, inefficient early warning mechanisms for intelligence and unclear foreign policy objectives and poor coordination have hindered effective progress. Despite this interest, however, it is difficult to gauge the influence of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in the Kenyan and Somali context, hence the need for this study.

The threat of transnational terrorism across Africa and the responses from governments in the region differ in a number of ways and can best be understood in their specific political, cultural and historic contexts. Each country has had its own unique experience with the phenomenon and in countering it, with many having had to confront the threat years before September 2001 (Jenkins, 2002). For example, the recent and ongoing terrorism-related activities across North Africa and now moving into the Sahel highlight both the persistence and scope of a threat that affects each country in one form or another and the region as a whole. Despite the considerable efforts by governments in North Africa, there is still a heightened terrorist threat there. A number of terrorist groups are present, most notably al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that have engaged in suicide bombings, money laundering, smuggling, kidnappings and drug and human trafficking as well as other illicit activities across the neighboring borders of Mauritania, Niger, Libya, Chad and Mali. In fact, the rapid growth of entwined transnational criminal networks operating between North Africa and the Sahel is now threatening the security stability in the region (Kafe, 2013). Yet, there seems to be a dearth of research to examine how security-based diplomacy influences transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia, and hence the need for this study.

Kenya and Somalia have been affected by terrorism both in terms of massive loss of lives and property as well as economic development. The two countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations (Bush, 2002). Since emerging from an era of colonialism under Italy and Britain, Somalia has passed through military dictatorship, famine, and civil war to regional fragmentation. In the modern period, Americans best remember the loss of U.S. military personnel that followed attempts to secure order in the



country as part of a United Nations operation (Arend, 2006). Whereas Kenya and Somalia and other actors have realized the need for a comprehensive strategy against transnational terrorism, terror activities witnessed in both countries calls for attention. This is why there was need for a study on security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in the Kenyan and Somalia.

Kenya has not been exempted in the terrorist attack trends. The country has been hit severally by acts of terrorism: in 1980 when a bomb destroyed the ballroom of the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel in Nairobi; August 7, 1998 when the U.S. Embassy was bombed; and November 28, 2002 when terrorists attacked the Israel owned Kikambala Paradise Hotel near Mombasa in the Coast Province (Kuto., 2004). Subsequent acts of terrorism on Kenyan soil have been minor in scope when compared to those previous acts. This trend therefore demands for an extensive study and analysis of various factors that motivate terror organizations and the impacts their activities have on the affected states (Li & Schaub 2004). The above attacks demonstrate Kenya's significance in terms of recent transnational terrorism. Moreover, the scale and complexity of attacks in Kenya strongly suggests a permissive environment exists for terror group operations. Yet, security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia has not been adequately investigated.

A report by Buzan, and Hansen, (2009) indicates that Somali fundamentalist movement, which has been active in Somali politics since the late 1980's, is rooted in the 1950's but was reinforced by state collapse in 1991 and the resultant civil war, international intervention, external influence, and the subsequent efforts made by the Somalis themselves at new patterns of political reconstruction in a bid to shape their own destiny. On the other hand, Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, supported by generous Western assistance, have been at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. There are strong structural foundations for radicalization in Kenya and Somalia. Radicalization has continued to spread building both on the economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states (ISS, 2012). The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalize and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalizing on long-standing grievances against the central state. This problem could grow more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia. Radicalization is a grave threat to Kenya's security and stability (Mohamed, 2013). Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late is thus a priority. While counterterrorism is a broad and varying concept that has been understood and implemented in numerous ways, available studies on security-based diplomacy and management of terrorism are still sparse and thus a priority area for research.

The September 2013 al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall (and the recent attacks in Lamu and Mandera) have focused the world's attention on Kenya and counterterrorism efforts. Despite Kenya's counterterrorism efforts, the implications of KDF intervention in Somalia raise issues of concern for investigation. Despite the efforts made in management of transnational terrorism, the polarizing tendencies of terrorist radicalization; the intelligence failures on how government agencies interact and share information with one another (Mohamed, 2013) and the underlying challenges of porous borders can hamper the ability of law enforcement to identify and detain potential terrorists. Moreover, while multilateral and bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent shift to security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism has received little scholarly attention, particularly at the national level. This is why there was need to investigate security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia.

Statement of the Problem

A security-based diplomacy strategy in counterterrorism in Kenya was launched to ensure a safe and secure environment for sustained socio-economic development. In October, 2011, the KDF deployed its troops to Somalia to respond to numerous Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi and subsequent infiltrations into North Eastern during which security personnels were attacked. Although the Government of Kenya was prompted to implement the security-based diplomacy approach as a measure of combat terrorism, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as al-shabaab and its affiliates constitute a new danger that still challenges standing tools and institutions charged with providing national security. Counterterrorism measures have been heightened and Kenyan government has been developing a legal architecture through robust military, enhancing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing mechanisms, stringent border controls and counterradicalization programs. Yet, this has tended to negatively impact on its relations with Somalia, weighed down on the ground upon which military intervention has been justified and the potential consequences that come with it.

In the recent past, security agencies have been put on the alert following terror attacks. However, the influences of extremist element in Somalia have since elicited the challenge of terrorist radicalization following the 'Operation Linda Nchi' initiative



by the Kenya Defence Forces. In addition, Kenya's porous borders necessitate a stable environment in which to grow terrorist radicalization. The Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remains the primary terrorist threat in Kenya and the region at large. Verhoeven (2015) argues that the consequences of the absence of the state in most parts of Somalia in terms of the growth of terrorism are immense. Somali security forces and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continue to make gains against al-Shabaab. Despite measures adopted, the threat of terrorism emanating from Somalia remains real (Verhoeven, (2015); (September 2013 attack on Westgate Shopping Mall; June 2014 attacks in Mpeketoni and Mporomooko in Lamu; November 22 attacks where 28 passengers were killed in Mandera; the December 2, 2014 attacks that left 36 people dead at a quarry at Koromey in Mandera County). The recent attack on 15th January 2015 where al Shabaab attacked the Kenya Army (KDF) AMISOM Contingent Forward Operations Base (FOB) manned in El-Adde, Gedo region of Somalia have focused the world's attention on Kenya and Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, highlighting significant shortcomings in the Kenyan security forces. This paper sought to examine the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

Literature Review

Terrorist Radicalization and Management of Transnational Terrorism

Borum, (2011) assert that terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Skillicorn *et al* (2013) says that possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective (Borum, 2011). According to the definition provided by the European Commission in its 2005 Communication 'Terrorist Recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization', "violent radicalization" involves embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism. The term "violent radicalization" originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004. It is not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of socialization leading to the use of violence (Johnston, 2006). In light of this, a more comprehensive counterradicalization mandate is needed and that is why the study examined the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

Radicalization : Catalysts and Causes

Contemporary events, arising from the foreign and domestic policies of both Western and Muslim governments, have had significant effects on the politicization of Muslims, especially those in the diaspora (Skocpol, 2005). But Esposito (2004) says that the identification with the ummah and resentment at the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide have had unforeseen repercussions. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was the beginning. No matter that Shias rather than Sunnis deposed the secular and autocratic Shah, Muslims were united in seeing this as a victory for Islam and evidence that at last a pure Islamic state could be established despite corrupt Arab governments and their Western supporters (Esposito, 2004). However, Skocpol, (2005) observes that the effect on Muslim consciousness and sense of identity was immense. Revolutionary Iran galvanized Muslim politics and also gained the support of the most militant Sunni elements within it. Similarly, Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie, following the publication of his book *The Satanic Verses*, was another turning point in the politicization process, one which generated a new sense of empowerment and fuelled an active interest in Muslim revivalism (Skocpol, 2005). Against this analysis, there is need for such studies in Africa, with particular emphasis in Kenya and Somalia where the trend of terrorism and radicalization have been reported.

Contributing Factors of Terrorist Radicalization

Although a number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of radicalization processes leading to terrorism, it is impossible to identify one single root cause. The convergence of several possible contributing variables can usually be found at the origin of the radicalization process. Since terrorism and radicalization leading to it may arise for a number of reasons, precipitant factors vary according to each individual experience of and pathway to radicalization. A considerable variety of contributing or facilitating factors can trigger the radicalization process in varying degrees at the intersection of personal history and that enabling environment (Alonso, et, al 2008). As there is no set hierarchy of facilitating factors that lead towards radicalization into violence the examples described here are not listed in any particular order. The enabling environment may for instance contain historical antecedents of political violence or, on a more contemporary level, concrete experiences of civil war or brutal encounters with unjust authority. Excessive repression by state authorities is likely to contribute to a climate of mutual distrust among those affected and assists in creating an atmosphere in which disparate social aggregates will be inclined to antagonism and entrenchment instead of conflict resolution (Wiley, 2011). Nevertheless, the shift towards security-based diplomacy in countering transnational terrorism within the context of state-centric counter-radicalization measures has not been largely explored.



Socio-Political Alienation and a Failure of Integration

Perhaps the most often cited precursor of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is the lack of socio-political integration particular Muslim communities have with their broader society, and relatedly, their experiences of discrimination, victimization, and xenophobia (Wilner, 2010). Jenkins (2004) adds that the assumption rests on the notion that individuals and fringe groups who fail to properly associate with their host (or native) country and nation - the so-called “unassimilated” eventually seek other like-minded individuals to associate with. In so doing, they construct a narrow social network that is distinct from broader societal ones and establish identities that reflect the “clique” rather than the nation. As a result, some radicalized individuals distance themselves politically, socially, and even ideologically from the broader community, eventually rejecting the national identity shared by their fellow citizens, along with the collective’s underlining political ideology, historical narrative, and related value-systems. Anti-democratic action and violence is one possible outcome (Jenkins, 2004). The socio-political dynamics in counterterrorism call for amore comprehensive planning to achieve an effective counterterrorism mandate and hence the need for this study.

Reaction to Foreign Policy

Another factor considered a precursor to radicalization is the reaction to, and eventual violent rejection of, a host or native state’s foreign policy (Wilner, 2010). For example, Western militant jihadists, some argue, are motivated by perceived injustices taking place against Muslims around the globe. Bin Laden has put it this way: “The truth is the whole Muslim world is the victim of international terrorism, engineered by America and the United Nations. We are a nation whose sacred symbols have been looted and whose wealth and resources have been plundered. It is normal for us to react against the forces that invade our land and occupy it.” For reasons to do with trans-national religious solidarity, the alleged victimization of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories, Somalia, Chechnya and elsewhere by United States, its allies and other actors usually associated with the Western world (NATO, the IMF, the UN) compels Western Muslims to act. “Perceived provocation” insults against Islam (i.e. the publication of The Satanic Verses (1988), according to Strömbäck, (2008) the Mohammad Cartoons and the screening of films Submission; these and other developments, the argument suggests, humiliate and anger some Western Muslims to the point that they feel justified to take revenge against the citizens and states that condone or participate in these perceived injustices (Wilner, & Dubouloz, 2010). Therefore, formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late must be a priority. This is why the current study examine the influence of state-centric terrorist radicalization in management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

Recruiting Strategies into Terrorist Radicalization

The academic study of terrorist groups since September 11 has been prolific and provides insight regarding how terrorist groups form, become motivated to violence, and eventually lose their appeal to the public ultimately resulting in the terrorist’s group’s failure and disintegration. O’donnell, (2008) have produced substantial works that suggest radicalization is a principal concern for the foreseeable future. Social identity theory (SIT) “is based on an insistence that human action needs to be understood in its social context.” (Deardorff, (2010) this theory may provide a foundation for understanding the radicalization phenomenon, but there are disagreements regarding its core components. Rational actor theory, which suggests that most individuals tend to act in accordance with their perceived best interests, will also inform this study. Likewise, instrumental approaches contribute to the study at a macro-level, when exploring the nature of terrorist groups. However, sufficient discourse available in academic literature to explore how these aspects might apply to counterterrorism strategies is still scarce.

Terrorist Radicalization Among Youths

International Islamic terrorism is an evolving phenomenon. In the years since 9/11, a preponderance of the terrorist attacks carried out in USA, Kenya, and Somalia and elsewhere, has involved radicalized citizens. Loosely labelled as “homegrown terrorism”, perpetrators have been autonomously organized, have had little direct assistance from transnational terrorist networks, and prepare their attacks within the countries they plan on targeting (Kuto & Groves, 2004). While a consensus has formed concerning the importance radicalization in terrorism, very little research properly investigates the internal and cognitive processes inherent to radicalization in the Kenya-Somalia context.

Radicalization is best understood as a personal process in which the individual adopts extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). According to Jenkins (2004), “radicalization comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction.” It is a mental process that both prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour. Understanding what drives extremism and radicalization is perhaps the most challenging aspect of countering homegrown terrorism. Few, if any, generalizable rules seem to apply (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). This is important given the emerging trends of terrorist radicalization in Kenya and Somalia which continues to evolve in nature and scope.



Religion and Terrorist Radicalization

At the global level, polarizing tendencies and radicalization processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates. Within this global mood that is also characterized by widespread feelings of inequity and injustice a very acute sense of marginalization and humiliation exists, in particular within several Muslim communities worldwide as well as among immigrant communities with a Muslim background established in European countries. These perceptions and feelings are often underestimated by Western observers. Today's religious and political radicalization should however not be confounded. The former is closely intertwined with identity dynamics, whereas the latter is boosted by the aforementioned feelings of inequity whether real or perceived. Both expressions of radicalization processes are thus the result of very different individual and collective dynamic (Kuto & Groves, 2004). In light of these analyses, the link between radicalization and terrorism within the context of security-based diplomacy influencing the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia is critical for research.

State-Centric Counterradicalization Programs

Initiatives to counter violent radical groups have been developed in many countries. According to Virta (2008), the approach taken in each region varies, with some focusing primarily on law enforcement and government actions or initiatives aimed at preventing acts of terrorism and shutting down terrorist networks. While efforts to promote counter-radicalization programs are being made, Anspaha (2008), argues that there are a few initiatives or programs identified in some of the regions that directly address youth, or are aimed at stemming recruitment attempts in venues frequented by youths.

State-centric counterradicalization measures are being undertaken by states to respond to contemporary terrorism and violent extremism. Recently, there has been recognition that enhancing good governance and strengthening democratic institutions can offer a strategy as a counter-radicalization initiative (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Similarly, Fink and Barakat (2013) point out that counter-terrorism policies are being developed that include more proactive approaches with an emphasis on preventing terrorism and violent extremism by reducing the appeal of, and support for, extremist groups and ideologies. This evolution is reflected in a number of emerging norms and practices developed at the multilateral level, including the United Nations' Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), which promotes a multidimensional approach and urges states to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (Fink & Barakat, 2013).

On the other hand, the role of non-state actors in counterradicalization has merged, owing to the challenge that counter-terrorism policies often lead to stigmatization and discrimination against certain individuals based on characteristics such as religion, racial or ethnic origins. Briggs (2010) points out that youth can enhance international co-operation and public-private partnerships to develop practical measures to counter the use of the Internet and other means for the purposes of inciting violent extremism. Similarly, Ramirez (2008) points out that counterterrorism and counterradicalization requires a detailed and sophisticated understanding of individual and community dynamics and how these relate to the wider social context. Indeed, the need to acknowledge and address the risks to communities as well as state agencies highlights the fundamental connection between state and community security; which resonates with the current shift to security-based diplomacy that Kenya and Somalia face in the context of managing transnational terrorism.

The roles of women in international peace and security efforts have been underscored by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 and subsequent thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security issues (Couture, 2014). The roles of women as they relate to terrorism and counterterrorism issues, however, have remained less explored by policymakers and international counterterrorism actors. The potential for women to act as a vital resource in policy and planning on countering violent extremism (CVE) has traditionally remained largely untapped. Women play crucial roles in families, communities, educational institutions, law enforcement agencies and the broader public sector, and can bring important unique perspectives to understanding and countering violent extremism and terrorist radicalization (Carter, 2013).

The Role of Civil Society in Counterradicalization

The role of civil society in counterradicalization is now receiving attention among states. According to Rosand and Millar (2008), non-governmental and other civil society organizations (CSOs) have played a critical role in encouraging governments and the United Nations to calibrate their response to terrorism by working to be effective against those who mean harm without eroding human rights and the rule of law. Kumar (2001) on the other hand observes that civil society foster citizen participation and civic education. In light of this, Chandhoke (2002) suggests that civil society in this sense is an arena in which modern man not only legitimately gratifies his self-interest and develops his individuality, but also learns the value of group action, social solidarity, and the dependence of his welfare on others, which educate him for citizenship and prepare him for participation in the political arena of the state. Harrison (2006) points out that civil society can help to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable peoples, including victims of terrorism, and provide a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances.



On matters of counterradicalization, Rosand and Millar (2008) point out that civil society are helping to build networks of moderate Muslim leaders by working with religious, education, government, and media leaders on projects aimed at promoting a pluralistic, tolerant Islam. For example, one civil society in Indonesian partnered with popular music star to create an album promoting Islam as a religion of peace. However, Harrison (2006) asserts that although civil society are sometimes seen as potential allies of the state in promoting development, good governance, and human rights and other issues that help prevent terrorism and other forms of violence, too often they have been viewed with suspicion because they might be working among marginalized populations or be perceived as supporting political opponents of sitting governments. The result is that governments are increasingly reluctant to seek partnerships with CSOs (Harrison, 2006).

Conceptual Framework




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Research Methodology

This study first employed an exploratory research design to explore the variables and provide an opportunity for the researcher to collect systematic information on security-based diplomacy influencing management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia. The study also employed descriptive research design which was geared towards finding the extent to which the study variables on security-based diplomacy influence transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia.

The target population comprised individuals from various institutions as follows: state actors (Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and coordination, Police Headquarters, Kenya and Somalia Embassies, Immigration Officer Department; (Kenya-Somalia borders), Non state actors (Media houses, refugee camps, NGOs, Civil society) and religious institutions.

Table 1: Distribution of Study Population by Region (Town/ City)

No.	Categories Region	Population
1	Nairobi	3, 138, 136
2	Mombasa	1, 200, 090
3	Lamu	101,539
4	Mandera	1,025,756
5	Garissa	623, 060
6	Mogadishu	1,353,000
7	Kismayu	183, 300
8	Ras Kamboni	76,000
Total		7, 700, 881

This study utilized cluster sampling and purposive sampling to determine the settings and the participants. The sample size for the study included 120 from Nairobi, 100 from Mombasa, 24 from Garissa, 28 from Mandera, 42 from Lamu, 36 from Mogadishu, 26 from Kismayu and 24 from Ras Kamboni. The total sample size for the study was 400.

Data collection was both interactive (interviews and focus group discussions) and non-interactive involving questionnaire and document analysis. This triangulation enabled the researcher to obtain a variety of information on security-based diplomacy and the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

Data were analyzed by use of descriptive statistics; through quantitative and qualitative techniques. Qualitative data were drawn from open-ended questions in the questionnaire, document analysis, interview guide and focus group discussions to present the findings. Due to the qualitative impressions and feelings regarding security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management, they were more likely be suitable for qualitative analysis. The information generated from the analysis was



presented through direct quotes. Content and thematic analysis of the information from interviews and FGDs were undertaken to arrive at the objectives. Quantitative analysis involved use of numeric measures to evaluate the role of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia. Analysis was done based on descriptive statistics. Under descriptive statistics, frequencies and percentages were used to describe the data sets and results were presented in tables and charts.

Results and Discussion

At the global level, polarizing tendencies and radicalization processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates. Within this global mood that is also characterized by widespread feelings of inequity and injustice, an acute sense of marginalization and humiliation exists, in particular within several Muslim communities worldwide as well as among immigrant communities with a Muslim background established in European countries. These perceptions and feelings are also witnessed in the region and thus critical for investigation. The results established pull and push factors to terrorist radicalization range from socio-political alienation and failure of integration; religiosity, unemployment and social exclusion, discrimination within ethnic and or religious lines.




Figure 1.1: Religion and Terrorist Radicalization
 Source: Field Data, 2015

Results (Figure 1.1) revealed that the link between religion and terrorist radicalization largely highlighted from respondents in Kenya as compared to response from Somalia respondents. The varying response confirmed how the levels and types of causes and catalysts relate to each other and how they, when combined, result in terrorist radicalization.

The study also established that counter-radicalization programs have not been effectively implemented in Kenya and Somalia (Figure 1.2). Moreover, although progress in enhancing good governance and democratic institutions as a counter-radicalization initiative was seen as work in progress in Kenya, promoting co-existence across ethnic/religious groups has not been effective and conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms are still work in progress, especially in Somalia.




Figure 1.2: Existence of Counter-radicalization Programs in Schools



Table 1.1: Strategic Approach To Engaging With Specific Groups (Kenya) N=277

	Satisfactory	Fair	Not Satisfactory
Youth	55(20%)	116(42%)	105(38%)
Community Policing	44(16%)	161(58%)	72(26%)
Women	22(8%)	116(42%)	138(50%)
Civil Society	55(20%)	144(52%)	78(28%)
NGOs	33(12%)	133(48%)	111(40%)
Media	61(22%)	161(58%)	55(20%)

Source: Field Data, 2015

Table 1.2: Strategic Approach to Engaging with Specific Groups (Somalia) (N=73)

	Satisfactory	Fair	Not Satisfactory
Youth	13(18%)	37(50%)	23(32%)
Community Policing	21(30%)	20(28%)	32(44%)
Women	4(6%)	18(24%)	51(70%)
Civil Society	10(14%)	29(40%)	34(46%)
NGOs	7(10%)	44(60%)	22(30%)
Media	5(7%)	40(55%)	28(38%)

Source: Field Data, 2015

On the other hand, the findings (Table 1.1 and 1.2) indicated some efforts by Kenya and Somalia governments in adopting strategic approaches in engaging with specific groups to enhance collaboration with the view to countering terrorist radicalization. However, although progress is seen in engaging the youth, Women, community policing, media, NGOs, the role of civil society involvement was below average. Despite their demonstrated potential, the results suggest the capacity of civil society and counterradicalization field remains untapped. The internet was cited as a common strategy being used for recruiting members into terrorist radicalization; although financing and affiliation of terror networks were also highlighted. The findings established that community-focused initiatives in counter-radicalization are still weak (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3: Effectiveness of Community-Focused Initiatives in Counter-radicalization

	Kenya (N=277)	Somalia (N=73)
Effective	104(37.6%)	
Neutral	60(21.5%)	5(6.7%)
Not Effective	111(40.1%)	68(93.3%)

Source: Field Data, 2015

Although existing literature indicate that community-based counter-radicalization approaches are having an impact on directly addressing the crisis of radicalization among the youth, the results of this study also revealed that this initiative has not been fully utilized. Amongst other challenges, the study established mistrust between the security agencies and the communities as a major factor that impacts the extent of generating and sharing information among all officials involved in counterradicalisation and between them and the public.

Conclusions

State-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia are weak and disjointed. In particular, counterradicalization programs are still weak and disjointed. While effective counter-radicalization measures can offer a highly successful prevention interventions in the wake of new terror attacks and threats, socio-political alienation and failure of integration drive terrorist radicalization in Kenya and Somalia. The police are the most visible manifestation of the government's counter-terrorism policies so it is critical that their work does not unintentionally alienate Muslim communities. State-centric counter-radicalization measures should go beyond enhancing good governance and democratic institutions. It was established that while there are strategic approaches in engaging with specific groups, it is very difficult for civil society to play any meaningful role in cases where there is little political pluralism and where civil society structures are weak.



The internet has become an invaluable tool for global terrorism recruitment; used for propaganda, gathering intelligence, fundraising, recruiting, planning operations and conducting cyber-criminal activities. While the Kenyan government has authored a number of cyber security strategies, they all focus too much on technology and not enough on a comprehensive approach to battling cyber activity as another form of insurgency. The findings revealed that community-focused initiatives in counter-radicalization are still weak. Counterradicalization programs can be more effective by realizing the critical role communities play in identifying and addressing security issues in their areas. Understanding differences within the Muslim community is critical to designing the types of interventions and structures that will enable all communities to participate in a community-based counter-terrorism strategy without encountering undue negative outcomes in Somalia.

Recommendations

Formulate a Clear State-Centric Counter-radicalization Framework: Among the marginalized communities of Northern Kenya and Somalia, the counterterrorism agenda is perceived to have contributed to what they see as a series of repressive practices by state security forces. Both Kenya and Somalia governments need to formulate and implement counter-radicalization programs and outreach initiatives in order to create a diversified counter-radicalization strategy. A first step would be to undertake a baseline assessment of violent extremism and radicalization trends and formulate a clear curriculum for counter-radicalization framework. There is need for implementing a more holistic approach to strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law and on promoting democratic accountability, social inclusion as well as efforts in addressing socio-economic factors. For Somalia especially, the government must establish a series of initiatives in peace-building, promoting inter-faith co-existence and strengthening democratic institutions.

Engaging Civil Society in Public-Private Partnerships: The study established that civil society are negatively influenced by counterterrorism measures; and legislative and regulatory measures have made it more difficult for some civil society organizations to operate freely and effectively. Therefore, more attention should be paid to building the capacities of civil society in Kenya and empowering them in the context of efforts to support implementation of state-centric counter-radicalization measures and management of transnational terrorism. For Somalia, there is need for the Federal Government to embrace civil society as a hook for human rights and promote inter-clan relations to join together to develop and promote human rights-compliant counterterrorism policies.

Integrate Community-Based Approach in Counterradicalization: The effectiveness of the community-based approach in counterradicalization will require both Kenya and Somalia governments to consider conducting a crosscutting review of policies designed to tackle terrorism in order to determine which interventions are most effective in reaching most vulnerable communities. In particular, both government must address the poor educational attainment of young Muslims, partly through paying attention to what happens in the classroom. This can be achieved through supporting community level relationships facilitated with thought administrative leaders, religious leaders and the business community based on mutual interests beyond the scope of terrorism and community grievances. The government should work with related Ministries to facilitate community-led interventions to stop radicalization in its initial stages.

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